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ABSTRACT
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) in critical infrastructure face a per-
vasive threat from attackers, motivating research into a variety of
countermeasures for securing them. Assessing the effectiveness of
these countermeasures is challenging, however, as realistic bench-
marks of attacks are difficult to manually construct, blindly testing
is ineffective due to the enormous search spaces and resource re-
quirements, and intelligent fuzzing approaches require impractical
amounts of data and network access. In this work, we propose active
fuzzing, an automatic approach for finding test suites of packet-
level CPS network attacks, targeting scenarios in which attackers
can observe sensors and manipulate packets, but have no existing
knowledge about the payload encodings. Our approach learns re-
gression models for predicting sensor values that will result from
sampled network packets, and uses these predictions to guide a
search for payload manipulations (i.e. bit flips) most likely to drive
the CPS into an unsafe state. Key to our solution is the use of online
active learning, which iteratively updates the models by sampling
payloads that are estimated to maximally improve them. We eval-
uate the efficacy of active fuzzing by implementing it for a water
purification plant testbed, finding it can automatically discover a
test suite of flow, pressure, and over/underflow attacks, all with
substantially less time, data, and network access than the most
comparable approach. Finally, we demonstrate that our prediction
models can also be utilised as countermeasures themselves, imple-
menting them as anomaly detectors and early warning systems.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computer systems organization → Embedded and cyber-
physical systems; • Security and privacy→ Intrusion detection
systems; • Computing methodologies→ Active learning settings;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs), characterised by their tight and
complex integration of computational and physical processes, are
often used in the automation of critical public infrastructure [78].
Given the potential impact of cyber-attacks on these systems [46,
51, 60], ensuring their security and protection has become a more
important goal than ever before. The different temporal scales,
modalities, and process interactions in CPSs, however, pose a signif-
icant challenge for solutions to overcome, and have led to a variety
of research into different possible countermeasures, including ones
based on anomaly detection [11, 15, 27, 45, 48, 52, 58, 61, 66, 69, 71],
fingerprinting [12, 13, 44, 56], invariant-based monitoring [7, 8, 10,
18, 24, 25, 28, 39, 82], and trusted execution environments [74].
Assessing how effective these different countermeasures are at
detecting and preventing attacks is another challenge in itself. A
typical solution is to use established benchmarks of attacks [2, 41],
which have the advantage of facilitating direct comparisons be-
tween approaches, e.g. as done so in [52, 58, 61]. Such benchmarks,
unfortunately, are few and far between: constructing them manu-
ally requires a great deal of time and expertise in the targeted CPS
(all while risking insider bias), and generalising them from one CPS
to another is a non-starter given the distinct processes, behaviours,
and complexities that different systems exhibit.
An alternative solution is to generate benchmarks using auto-
mated testing and fuzzing, with these techniques overcoming the
complexity of CPSs by having access to machine learning (ML)
models trained on their data (e.g. logs of sensor readings, actuator
states, or network traffic). Existing solutions of this kind, however,
tend to make unrealistic assumptions about an attacker’s capabil-
ities, or require a large body of training data that might not be
available. The fuzzer of [26], for example, can automatically iden-
tify actuator configurations that drive the physical states of CPSs
to different extremes, but the technology assumes the attacker to
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have total control of the network and actuators, and is underpinned
by a prediction model trained on complete sets of data logs from
several days of operation. Blindly fuzzing without such a model,
however, is ineffective at finding attacks: first, because the search
spaces of typical CPSs are enormous; and second, because of the
wasted time and resources required to be able to observe the effects
on a system’s physical processes.
In this paper, we present active fuzzing, an automatic approach
for finding test suites of packet-level CPS network attacks, targeting
scenarios in which training data is limited, and in which attackers
can observe sensors and manipulate network packets but have no
existing knowledge about the encodings of their payloads. Our
approach constructs regression models for predicting future sensor
readings from network packets, and uses these models to guide a
search for payload manipulations that systematically drive the sys-
tem into unsafe states. To overcome the search space and resource
costs, our solution utilises (online) active learning [63], a form of
supervised ML that iteratively re-trains a model on examples that
are estimated to maximally improve it. We apply it to CPSs by
flipping bits of existing payloads in a way that is guided by one of
two frameworks: Expected Model Change Maximization [17], and
a novel adaptation of it based on maximising behaviour change.
We query the effects of sampled payloads by spoofing them in the
network, updating the model based on the observed effect.
We evaluate our approach by implementing it for the Secure
Water Treatment (SWaT) testbed [4], a scaled-down version of a
real-world water purification plant, able to produce up to five gal-
lons of drinking water per minute. SWaT is a complex multi-stage
system involving chemical processes such as ultrafiltration, de-
chlorination, and reverse osmosis. Communication in the testbed
is organised into a layered network hierarchy, in which we target
the ring networks at the ‘lowest’ level that exchange data using
EtherNet/IP over UDP. Our implementation manipulates the bi-
nary string payloads of 16 different types of packets, which when
considered together have up to 22752 different combinations.
Despite the enormous search space, we find that active fuzzing
is effective at discovering packet-level flow, pressure, and over/un-
derflow attacks, achieving comparable coverage to an established
benchmark [41] and an LSTM-based fuzzer [26] but with substan-
tially less training time, data, and network access. Furthermore, by
manipulating the bits of payloads directly, active fuzzing bypasses
the logic checks enforced by the system’s controllers. These attacks
are more sophisticated than those of the LSTM-based fuzzer [26],
which can only generate high-level actuator commands and is un-
able to manipulate such packets. Finally, we investigate the utility
of the learnt models in a different role: defending a CPS directly.
We use them to implement anomaly detection and early warning
systems for SWaT, finding that whenmodels are suitably expressive,
they are effective at detecting both random and known attacks.
Summary of Contributions.We present active fuzzing, a black-
box approach for automatically discovering packet-level network
attacks on real-world CPSs. By iteratively constructing amodel with
active learning, we demonstrate how to overcome enormous search
spaces and resource costs by sampling new examples thatmaximally
improve the model, and propose a new algorithm that guides this
process by seeking maximally different behaviour. We evaluate the
Figure 1: The Secure Water Treatment (SWaT) testbed
efficacy of the approach by implementing it for a complex real-world
critical infrastructure testbed, and show that it achieves comparable
coverage to an established benchmark and LSTM-based fuzzer but
with significantly less data, time, and network access. Finally, we
show that the learnt models are also effective as anomaly detectors
and early warning systems.
Organisation. In Section 2, we introduce the SWaT testbed, with
a particular focus on its network and the structure of its packets.
In Section 3, we present the components of our active fuzzing
approach, and explain how to implement it both in general and
for SWaT. In Section 4, we evaluate the efficacy of our approach at
finding packet-level attacks, and investigate secondary applications
of our models as anomaly detectors and early warning systems. In
Section 5, we discuss some related work, then conclude in Section 6.
2 BACKGROUND
In the following, we present an overview of SWaT, awater treatment
testbed that forms the critical infrastructure case study we evaluate
active fuzzing on. We describe in more detail its network hierarchy
and the structure of its packets, before stating the assumptions we
make about the capabilities of attackers.
SWaT Testbed. The CPS forming the case study of this paper is
SecureWater Treatment (SWaT) [4], a scaled-down version of a real-
world water purification plant, able to produce up to five gallons
of safe drinking water per minute. SWaT (Figure 1) is intended
to be a testbed for advancing cyber-security research on critical
infrastructure, with the potential for successful technologies to be
transferred to the actual plants it is based on. The testbed has been
the subject of multiple hackathons [9] involving researchers from
both academia and industry, and over the years has established a
benchmark of attacks to evaluate defence mechanisms against [41].
SWaT treats water across multiple distinct but co-operating
stages, involving a variety of complex chemical processes, such
as de-chlorination, reverse osmosis, and ultrafiltration. Each stage
in the CPS is controlled by a dedicated Allen-Bradley ControlLogix
programmable logic controller (PLC), which communicates with
the sensors and actuators relevant to that stage over a ring network,
and with other PLCs over a star network. Each PLC cycles through
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###[ Ethernet ]###
dst = e4:90:69:a3:0c:f6
src = 00:1d:9c:c8:03:e7
type = IPv4
###[ IP ]###
version = 4
ihl = 5
tos = 0xbc
len = 68
id = 18067
flags =
frag = 0
ttl = 64
proto = udp
chksum = 0xb1f3
src = 192.168.0.10
dst = 192.168.0.12
\options \
###[ UDP ]###
sport = 2222
dport = 2222
len = 48
chksum = 0xfca2
###[ ENIP_CPF ]###
count = 2
\items \
|###[ CPF_AddressDataItem ]###
| type_id = Sequenced Address Item
| length = 8
|###[ CPF_SequencedAddressItem ]###
| connection_id= 469820023
| sequence_number= 18743
|###[ CPF_AddressDataItem ]###
| type_id = Connected Transport Packet
| length = 22
|###[ Raw ]###
| load = '~2\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00
\r\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00
\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00
\x00'
Figure 2: A SWaT packet after dissection by Scapy
its program, computing the appropriate commands to send to ac-
tuators based on the latest sensor readings received as input. The
system consists of 42 sensors and actuators in total, with sensors
monitoring physical properties such as tank levels, flow, pressure,
and pH values, and actuators including motorised valves (for open-
ing an inflow pipe) and pumps (for emptying a tank). A historian
regularly records the sensor readings and actuator commands dur-
ing SWaT’s operation. SCADA software and tools developed by
Rockwell Automation are available to support some analyses.
The sensors in SWaT are associated with manufacturer-defined
ranges of safe values, which in normal operation, they are expected
to remain within. If a sensor reports a (true) reading outside of
this range, we say the physical state of the CPS has become unsafe.
If a level indicator transmitter, for example, reports that the tank
in stage one has become more than a certain percentage full (or
empty), then the physical state has become unsafe due to the risk
of an overflow (or underflow). Unsafe pressure states indicate the
risk of a pipe bursting, and unsafe levels of water flow indicate the
risk of possible cascading effects in other parts of the system.
SWaT implements a number of standard safety and security
measures for water treatment plants, such as alarms (reported to the
operator) for when these thresholds are crossed, and logic checks
for commands that are exchanged between the PLCs. In addition,
several attack defence mechanisms developed by researchers have
been installed (see Section 5).
The network of the SWaT testbed is organised into a layered hi-
erarchy compliant with the ISA99 standard [53], providing different
levels of segmentation and traffic control. The ‘upper’ layers of the
hierarchy, Levels 3 and 2, respectively handle operation manage-
ment (e.g. the historian) and supervisory control (e.g. touch panel,
engineering workstation). Level 1 is a star network connecting the
PLCs, and implements the Common Industrial Protocol (CIP) over
EtherNet/IP. Finally, the ‘lowest’ layer of the hierarchy is Level
0, which consists of ring networks (EtherNet/IP over UDP) that
connect individual PLCs to their relevant sensors and actuators.
Tools such as Wireshark [6] and Scapy [3] can be used to dissect
the header information of a Level 0 SWaT packet, as illustrated
in Figure 2. Here, the source IP address (192.168.0.10) and target
IP address (192.168.0.12) correspond respectively to PLC1 and its
remote IO device. Actuator commands (e.g. “open valveMV101”) are
encoded in the binary string payloads of these packets. In Figure 2,
the payload is 22 bytes long, but Level 0 packets can also have
a payload length of 10 or 32 bytes. Randomly manipulating the
payloads has limited use given the size of the search space (22752
possibilities when considering the 16 types of packets we sample;
see Section 3.1). Our solution uses active learning to overcome this
enormous search space, establishing how different bits impact the
physical state without requiring any knowledge of the encoding.
Attacker Model. In this work, we assume that attackers have
knowledge of the network protocol (e.g. EtherNet/IP over UDP
at Level 0 of SWaT), and thus are able to intercept (unencrypted)
packets, dissect their header information, and manipulate their
payloads. We assume that the packet payloads are binary strings,
but do not assume any existing knowledge about their meaning
or encoding schemes. We assume that attackers can always access
the ‘true’ sensor readings while the system is operating, in order
to be able to observe the effects of a packet manipulation, or to
judge whether or not an attack was successful. These live sensor
readings can be observed over several minutes at a time in order to
perform some pre-training and active learning, but in contrast to
other approaches (e.g. [26]), we do not require access to extensive
sets of data for offline learning, and we do not require the ability to
arbitrarily issue high-level actuator commands across the system—
we do so only by manipulating payloads.
3 ACTIVE FUZZING
Our approach for automatically finding packet-level network at-
tacks in CPSs consists of the following steps. First, data is collected:
packets are sniffed from the network, their payloads are extracted,
and (true) sensor readings are queried. Second, we pre-train initial
regression models, that take concatenations of packet payloads
and predict the future effects on given sensors. Third, we apply an
online active learning framework, iteratively improving the current
model by sampling payloads estimated to maximally improve it.
Finally, we search for candidate attacks by flipping important bits
in packet payloads, and using our learnt models to identify which
of them will drive the system to a targeted unsafe state.
Algorithm 1 presents the high-level algorithm of these steps
for active fuzzing. Note that the notation in Line 8 indicates con-
catenation of sequences. In particular, ts copies of the vector p
are appended to sequence P to add additional weight to the new
example when the model is re-trained.
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Algorithm 1: High-Level Overview of Active Fuzzing
Input: Sensor s , prediction time ts , pre-training time tp
Output: Prediction model Ms
1 Sniff packets and observe values of s for tp minutes;
2 Construct a sequence P of feature (bit-)vectors from packet
payloads;
3 Construct a sequence V such that each V [i] contains the value of s
observed ts seconds after P [i] was sniffed;
4 (Pre-)train a regression model Ms predicting V from P ;
5 repeat
6 Sample a new feature vector p using an active learning
framework (Section 3.2);
7 Wait for ts seconds then observe the value vs of s ;
8 P := P⌢ ⟨p ⟩ts ; [concatenation of ts copies]
9 V := V⌢ ⟨vs ⟩ts ;
10 until timeout;
11 Re-train Ms to predict V from P ;
12 return model Ms ;
In the following, we describe the steps of the algorithm in more
detail, and present the details of one particular implementation for
the SWaT water purification testbed.
3.1 Packet Sniffing and Pre-Training
Collecting Raw Data. Both the pre-training and active learning
phases of our approach require access to two types of data from the
CPS under test. First, they must be able to sniff the network packets
and extract their binary string payloads. Second, they must be able
to access the true readings of any sensors under consideration, as
the idea is to be able to observe the effects on sensor readings of
different payload manipulations.
For SWaT, our approach extracts packets from Level 0 of the
network hierarchy, i.e. the packets exchanged between PLCs and
remote IO devices. By targeting this lowest level of the network,
we ensure that our manipulations are altering the actuator states
directly. For our prototype, we physically connect some Raspberry
Pis to the PLCs of SWaT and sniff the packets using a network
connection bridge; in reality, an attacker might sniff packets by
other means, e.g. exploiting the wireless connection when enabled.
As Level 0 implements the EtherNet/IP protocol, we can use the
tcpdump packet analyser to capture packets, and Scapy to further
extract their contents.
For our prototype, we obtain the current sensor readings by
querying SWaT’s historian. We assume that the historian’s data
is true, i.e. that the system is not simultaneously under attack by
another entity, and that it is operationally healthy. In reality, an
attacker might access this information through an exploit in the
historian, e.g. an EternalBlue exploit [1], or a backdoor connection
(both of which were discovered in SWaT hackathons [9]).
Pre-Training Models. A goal of our approach is to minimise the
amount of data required to train an accurate prediction model for
sensor readings. We thus proceed in two phases: a pre-training
phase, and an active learning phase. The pre-training phase uses
network data to construct an initial prediction model, the idea
being that it provides a reasonable enough starting point such that
model for 
sensor s
current sensor values
⟨s0, s1, s2, …⟩
concatenation of payloads 
⟨p1p2…p16⟩
predicted (change of)
reading of s
Figure 3: Input/output of a learnt model for sensor s
active learning will later converge. A key distinction between the
two stages is how the attacker behaves: while pre-training, they sit
silently to observe normal packets of the system; but while actively
learning, they intervene by injecting (possibly) abnormal packets
and then observe the effects. It is thus important to minimise the
amount of the time spent in the latter phase to avoid detection.
We require a series of regression models, one per sensor, that
take as input the payloads of captured packets, and return as output
a prediction of how the considered (true) sensor reading will evolve
after a time period. To achieve this goal requires a number of system-
specific decisions to be made, for example, the types of packets to
train the model on, and a fixed time period that is appropriate to
the processes involved (some will change the physical state more
quickly than others). There are several types of regression models
that are fit for the task. In this work, we focus on two: linear models
and gradient-boosting decision trees (GBDT) [35]. A linear model
is the simplest possible choice and thus serves as our baseline,
whereas the GBDT is a well-known and popular example of a non-
linear model. Both models can be integrated with existing active
learning frameworks for regression, which was a key reason for
their selection. Several more expressive models, such as neural
networks, do not have any good online active learning strategies
(to the best of our knowledge).
In SWaT, packets are collected from Level 0 (see Section 2) in
the first four stages of the system. By observing the network traffic,
we identified four different types of packets in each stage based
on payload lengths and headers: packets that have payloads of
length (1) 10 bytes; (2) 32 bytes; (3) 22 bytes, with a source IP
address of 192.168.0.S0; and (4) 22 bytes, with a source IP address
of 192.168.0.S2. Here, S is replaced with the given stage of the
system (1, 2, 3, or 4). Across these four stages, there are thus 16
different types of packets in total. In constructing a feature vector
for training, we make no assumptions about the meaning of these
different packets, so select the first of each type of packet that is
collected at a particular time point and concatenate their payloads
together in a fixed order. This leads to feature vectors containing a
series of 2752 bits.
Along with constructing a sufficient number of feature vectors
(experimentally determined in Section 4), we also query the his-
torian for sensor values after fixed time periods have passed. For
flow and pressure sensors this time period is 5 seconds; for tank
level sensors, it is 30 seconds, owing to the fact that they change
state rather more slowly. With this data collected, we train linear
and GBDT models for each individual sensor in turn, such that a
sensor reading can be predicted for a given bit vector of payloads
from the 16 types. An overview of the input/output of these models
in given in Figure 3. Note that for flow and pressure sensors, the
corresponding models predict their future values, whereas for tank
level sensors, the corresponding models predict by how much they
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will change. This discrepancy is due to the fact that the effects of
flow/pressure attacks stabilise at a final value very quickly.
3.2 Active Learning and Attack Discovery
Active Learning. After completing the pre-training phase, we
should now have a model that is capable of making some reasonable
predictions with respect to normal packets in the CPS network.
However, the attacks we need for testing the CPS are not necessarily
composed of normal packets. We need to train the model further
on a broader set of examples, but cannot do it blindly owing to
the expense of running the system and the enormity of the search
space (22752 potential combinations of feature vectors in SWaT).
Our solution is to train the model further using (online) active
learning [63], a supervised ML approach that iteratively improves
the current model. Theoretical studies have shown that active learn-
ing may exponentially reduce the amount of training data needed,
e.g. [33, 37, 38]. The idea is to reduce the amount of additional data
by sampling examples that are estimated to maximally change the
current model in some way. In our case, we use one of two active
learning frameworks to guide the construction of new feature vec-
tors by flipping the bits of existing ones (this is more conservative
than constructing payloads from scratch, but minimises the pos-
sibility of packet rejection). Once new feature vectors have been
sampled, we can decompose them into their constituent packets,
spoof them in the network, observe their effects on true sensor
readings, then re-train the model accordingly.
While active learning for classification problems is well-studied,
there are limited active learning frameworks for regression, and
some of the ones that exist make assumptions unsuitable for our ap-
plication (e.g. a Gaussian distribution [21]). However, the Expected
Model Change Maximization (EMCM) approach of Cai et al. [17]
avoids this assumption and is suitable for CPSs. Their framework is
based on the idea of sampling new examples that are estimated to
maximally change the model itself, i.e. the gradient in linear mod-
els, or a linear approximation of GBDTs based on ‘super features’
extracted from the trees (see [17] for details).
Inspired by EMCM, and motivated by the fact we can query live
behaviour of the system, we also propose a variant of the framework
called Expected Behaviour Change Maximisation (EBCM). Instead
of sampling examples estimated to maximally change the model,
EBCM attempts to identify examples that cause maximally differ-
ent behaviour from what the system is currently exhibiting. For
example, if a considered sensor reading is increasing, then EBCM
may identify examples that cause it to decrease as much as possible
instead. The intuition of the approach is that exploring different
behaviour in a particular context is more informative. It also seeks
to check that unfamiliar packets predicted to cause that behaviour
really do cause that behaviour, updating the model otherwise.
Algorithm 2 summarises the steps of EBCM, in which a new fea-
ture vector is constructed by sampling additional packets, randomly
flipping the bits of several copies, and choosing a vector that would
have led to a maximally different reading than the original. Note
that to ensure some variation, the feature vector is chosen from a
set of several using Roulette Wheel Selection [43], which assigns to
each candidate a probability of being selected based on its ‘fitness’,
here defined as the absolute difference between what the sensor
Algorithm 2: Expected Behaviour Change Maximisation
Input: Prediction model Ms , prediction time ts , maximum number
of bits to flip nm
Output: Feature (bit-)vector pf
1 Sniff current packets and construct a feature vector po based on
their payloads;
2 Wait for ts seconds then observe the value vs of s ;
3 Let P := ⟨⟩; [empty sequence]
4 Let D := ⟨⟩;
5 repeat
6 Construct a new vector p from po by randomly selecting and
flipping n ≤ nm bits;
7 vp := Ms (p);
8 P := P⌢ ⟨p ⟩;
9 D := D⌢ ⟨ |vs − vp | ⟩;
10 until timeout;
11 Select a feature vector pf from P using Roulette Wheel Selection
with corresponding fitness values in D ;
12 return feature (bit-)vector pf ;
reading actually became (with respect to the original packets) and
what the current model predicted for the candidate. If fi is the
fitness of one of n candidates, then its probability of being selected
is fi/∑nj=1 fj . A random number is generated between 0 and the
sum of the candidates’ fitness scores. We then iterate through the
candidates until the accumulated fitness is larger than that number,
returning that final candidate as our chosen bit-vector.
For SWaT, we implemented both EMCM and EBCM, using the
same construction of feature vectors (i.e. a concatenation of the
payloads of 16 types of packets). Upon computing new feature
vectors using these active learning frameworks, we then break the
vectors down into their constituent packets, and spoof them in
Level 0 of the network using Scapy. After spoofing, we wait either
5 or 30 seconds (when targeting flow/pressure or tank level sensors
respectively) before querying the latest sensor value, then re-train
the model based on the new packets and readings observed. This
process is repeated until a suitable timeout condition (Section 4.2).
Attack Discovery and Fuzzing. In the final step of our approach,
we use the learnt models (Figure 3) to discover attacks, i.e. packet
manipulations that will drive targeted (true) sensor readings out of
their safe operational ranges. In particular, after choosing a sensor
to target, the corresponding model is used to evaluate a number
of candidate packet manipulations and reveal the one that is (pre-
dicted) to realise the attack most effectively. The final part of our
approach consists of generating those candidate packet manipula-
tions for the model to evaluate.
Algorithm 3 presents the steps of our packet manipulation pro-
cedure for attack discovery. The idea of the algorithm is to identify
the bits that are most important (i.e. have the most influence in the
prediction), generate candidates by flipping fixed numbers of those
bits, before broadening the search to other, less important bits too.
As different candidates are generated, they are evaluated against a
simple objective function that is maximised as the predicted sen-
sor state becomes closer to an edge of its safe operational range.
Suppose that vs denotes a value of sensor s , and that Ls and Hs
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Algorithm 3: Attack Discovery
Input: Prediction model Ms , number of bits to flip n, objective
function f
Output: A bit-vector pmax
1 Sniff current packets and construct a feature vector po based on
their payloads;
2 Construct a sequence Φ of (0-based) indices of po , from the position
with the highest feature importance (Section 3.2) to the lowest;
3 k := n − 1;
4 Done := ∅;
5 fmax := 0;
6 repeat
7 Φk := {i | i ∈ Φ[0..k ]};
8 Combs := {B | B ∈ 2Φk ∧ |B | = n ∧ B < Done };
9 for c ∈ Combs do
10 Construct p from po by flipping po [i] for every i ∈ c ;
11 if f (Ms (p)) > fmax then
12 fmax := f (Ms (p));
13 pmax := p
14 Done := Done ∪ c ;
15 k := k + 1;
16 until k == |Φ | or timeout;
17 return bit-vector pmax ;
respectively denote its lower and upper safety thresholds. Let:
ds =
{
min (|vs − Ls | , |vs − Hs |) Ls ≤ vs ≤ Hs
0 otherwise
A suitable objective function that is maximised by values approach-
ing either of the thresholds would then be:
f (vs ) = 1
ds/(Hs − Ls )
We calculate feature importance in one of two ways, depending
on the model used. For a linear model, the absolute value of the
model’s weight for that feature is taken as its importance. For a
GBDT model, since it is a boosting ensemble model with a bunch
of decision trees, we average the feature importance scores of these
trees to obtain the feature importance of the overall model.
For SWaT, we implemented attack discovery for multiple flow,
pressure, and tank level sensors, and used instances of the objective
function above for each of them. The feature vectors returned by Al-
gorithm 3 are broken into their constituent packets, then spoofed in
the network using Scapy. If an attack successfully drives a targeted
sensor out of its normal operational range (e.g. over/underflow),
we record this, adding the particular packet manipulation used to a
test suite of attacks, and document it accordingly (see Section 4 for
an experimental evaluation). Recall that in SWaT, the models for
tank levels sensors do not predict future values directly, but rather
the magnitude by which they will change by: as a consequence,
Algorithm 3 is adapted for these sensors by observing the current
reading at the beginning, then using it to calculate the input for the
objective function.
4 EVALUATION
We evaluate the effectiveness of active fuzzing for attack discovery
and detection using the SWaT testbed (Section 2).
4.1 Research Questions
Our evaluation design is centred around the following key research
questions (RQs):
RQ1 (Training Time): How much time is required to learn a
high-accuracy model?
RQ2 (Attack Discovery): Which model and active learning
setup is most effective for attack discovery?
RQ3 (Comparisons): Howdoes active fuzzing compare against
other CPS fuzzing approaches?
RQ4 (Attack Detection): Can the learnt models be used for
anomaly detection or early warnings?
RQ1 is motivated by our assumption that attackers do not have
access to large offline datasets for training, and may need to evade
anomaly detection systems. How long would an attacker need to
spend observing live sensor readings (pre-training) and spoofing
packets (active learning) before obtaining a high-accuracy model?
RQ2 aims to explore the different combinations of our regression
models with and without active learning, in order to establish which
is most effective for discovering packet-level CPS attacks, and to
quantify any added benefit of active learning in conquering the
huge search space. RQ3 is intended to check our work against a
baseline, i.e. its effectiveness in comparison to random search and
another guided CPS network fuzzer. Finally, RQ4 aims to explore
whether our learnt models can have a secondary application as part
of an anomaly detection or early warning system for attacks.
4.2 Experiments and Discussion
We present the design of our experiments for each of the RQs
in turn, as well as some tables of results and the conclusions we
draw from them. The programs we developed to implement these
experiments on the SWaT testbed are all available online [5].
RQ1 (Training Time). Our first RQ aims to assess the amount of
time an attacker would require to learn a high-accuracy model from
live packets. To answer this question, we design experiments for
the two phases of learning in turn.
First, we investigate how long the attacker must spend pre-
training on normal live sensor readings (i.e. without any manipu-
lation). Recall that our goal in this phase is not to obtain a highly
accurate model, but rather to find a reasonable enough model as
a starting point for active learning. To do this, we compute the r2
scores of linear and GBDT regression models for individual sen-
sors after training for different lengths of time. An r2 score is the
percentage of variation explained by the model, and reflects how
well correlated the predictions of a sensor and their actual future
values are. Prior to training, we collect 230 minutes of packet and
sensor data, splitting 180 minutes of it into a training set and the
remaining 50 minutes into a test set. For each sensor, we train linear
and GBDT models using the full 180 minutes (our upper limit of
the experiment), and compute their r2 scores using the test data.
We repeat this process for 10 minutes of data, then 20 minutes, . . .
up to 150 minutes at various intervals until it is clear that model
is converging. We judge that a model has converged when the im-
portance scores of its features (see Section 3.2) have stabilised up
to a small tolerance (0.5% for flow/pressure sensors; 5% for level
sensors) as the model is re-trained on new samples. All steps are
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repeated ten times and medians are reported to reduce the effects
of different starting states.
Second, given a model that has been pre-trained, we investigate
how long the attacker must then spend actively learning before the
model achieves a high accuracy. To do this, we pre-train linear and
GBDT prediction models for each sensor for the minimum amount
of time previously determined (in the first experiment). Then, for
both variants of active learning (Section 3.2), we sample new sensor
data from the system and retrain the models every 5 minutes. In
this experiment, we record the amount of time it takes for a model
to stabilise with a high r2 score, i.e. above 0.9, using the same 50
minutes of test data to compute this. We repeat these steps ten
times and compute the medians.
Results. Table 1 presents the results of our first experiment. The
columns correspond to the amount of training time (10 minutes
through to 180), whereas the rows correspond to regression mod-
els for individual SWaT sensors, including Flow Indicator Trans-
mitters (e.g. FIT101), a Differential Pressure Indicator Transmitter
(DPIT301), and Level Indicator Sensors (e.g. LIT101). For the LITs,
our models predict their values 30 seconds into the future (as tank
levels rise very slowly), whereas for all other sensors our models
make predictions for 5 seconds ahead. The values reported in the
table are r2 scores: here, a score of 1 indicates that the model and
test data are perfectly correlated, whereas a score of -1 would indi-
cate that there is no correlation at all. When there is clear evidence
of a model converging, we do not repeat the experiment for longer
training periods (except 180 minutes, our upper limit).
All of our models eventually converge during pre-training, ex-
cept the linear model for LIT401: the process involving this tank is
too complicated to be represented as a linear model due to the mul-
tiple interactions and dependencies involving other stages of the
testbed (the GBDT model does not suffer this problem). Note that
while pre-training leads to relatively high r2 scores for a number
of the models (e.g. the simpler processes involving flow), this does
not necessarily imply that the models will be effective for attack
discovery (as we investigate in RQ2). For the goal of determining a
minimum amount of pre-training time, we fix it at 40 minutes, as
all models (except Linear-LIT401) exhibit some positive correlation
by then (≥ 0.3). Some scores are still low, but this will allow us
to assess whether active learning is still effective when applied to
cases that lack a good pre-trained model.
Table 2 presents the results of our second experiment. Here,
the columns contain the sensors that each regression model is
targeting, whereas the rows contain the type of model and active
learning variant considered. The values reported are the number
of minutes (accurate up to 5 minutes) of active learning that it
takes before models achieve an r2 score above 0.9. Note that with
active learning, none of the linear models for tank level sensors
were able to exceed our r2 threshold (although they did converge
for LIT101 and LIT301 with lower scores). All GBDT models were
able to exceed the r2 threshold with active learning, indicating
that the additional expressiveness is important for some processes
of SWaT—likely because the actual processes are non-linear. The
amount of time required varied from 10 up to 45 minutes. Taking
the pre-training time into consideration:
Once pre-trained on 40 minutes of data observations, at-
tackers can accurately predict SWaT’s sensor readings after
10–45 minutes of active learning.
This is a significantly reduced amount of time compared to SWaT’s
LSTM-based fuzzer [26], the model of which was trained for ap-
proximately two days on a rich dataset compiled from four days of
constant operation.
RQ2 (Attack Discovery). Our second RQ aims to assess which
combinations of models and active learning setups (including no
active learning at all) are most effective for finding attacks, i.e. ma-
nipulations of packet payloads that would cause the true readings
of a particular sensor to eventually cross one of its safety thresholds
(e.g. risk of overflow, or risk of bursting pipe).
To do this, we experimentally calculate the success rates at finding
attacks for all variants of models covering the flow, pressure, and
tank level sensors. Furthermore, we do so while restricting the
manipulation of the packets’ payloads to different quantities of
bit flips, from 1–5 and 10 such flips. For each model variant, we
calculate the success rate by running our active fuzzer 1000 times
with the given model, and recording as a percentage the number
of times in which the resulting modified packet would cause the
physical state to cross1 a safety threshold. Note that it is important
to flip existing payload bits, rather than craft packets directly, as
the system’s built-in validation procedures may reject them.
Results. Table 3 presents the results of our experiment for RQ2.
Each sub-table reports on a restriction to a particular number of
payload bit flips, ranging from 1–5 and then 10. The columns contain
the sensors we are attempting to drive into unsafe states, whereas
the rows contain the type of model and active learning variant
considered (if any). The final row, Random (No Model), is discussed
as part of RQ3. The values recorded are success rates (%s), where
100% indicates that all 1000 model-guided bit flips would succeed,
and where 0% indicates that none of them would do. In the active
learning models, pre-training was conducted for 40 minutes (as
determined in RQ1). We also include a model that was pre-trained
only for 90 minutes—roughly the time to do both pre-training and
active learning—to ensure a fair comparison.
We can draw a number of conclusions from these results. First,
linear models are not expressive enough in general for driving
the bit flipping of payloads: their success rates for the LITs, for
example, is mostly 0%, and even at 10 bit flips numbers for most
sensors remain very low. GBDT quite consistently outperforms the
linear models, often approaching 100% success rates. Like the linear
models, GBDT struggled to attack the LITs for small numbers of bit
flips (likely because multiple commands are needed to affect these
sensors), but can attack them all once the restriction is lifted to ten
bit flips.
The expressiveness of the underlying model is critically im-
portant: active learning alone is not enough to compensate
for this.
Another conclusion that can be drawn from the tables relates to
the significantly higher success rates for variants using active learn-
ing, both for linear models and GBDT models. The combination of
active learning with the expressiveness of GBDT, in particular, leads
1With the exception of the low threshold for flow sensors, which is 0.
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Table 1: r2 scores (higher is better) of linear and GBDT sensor prediction models after different amounts of pre-training
Linear Models 10min 20min 30min 40min 50min 60min 70min 80min 100min 120min 150min 180min
Fl
ow
FIT101 0.3399 0.5998 0.6698 0.7391 0.8214 0.8475 0.8896 0.8712 · · · · · · · · · 0.8840
FIT201 -0.7112 -0.0775 0.7394 0.8381 0.8962 0.8931 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 0.7332
FIT301 -0.481 0.5292 0.8227 0.8949 0.9121 0.9001 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 0.8772
FIT401 -1.2513 -0.6149 0.1123 0.3142 0.6634 0.7235 0.6695 0.6143 · · · · · · · · · 0.6425
Pr. DPIT301 -0.2511 0.6070 0.8648 0.9563 0.9651 0.9642 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 0.9569
T.
Le
ve
l LIT101 0.0624 0.1516 0.6024 0.6582 0.6824 0.6168 0.7172 0.772 0.7965 0.8197 0.8133 0.8254
LIT301 -0.0806 0.0937 0.4248 0.4949 0.5963 0.6260 0.6583 0.4807 0.6209 · · · · · · 0.5426
LIT401 0.1543 0.0612 0.2942 0.0273 -0.2208 0.1119 -0.4902 0.007 0.1259 0.2412 0.0135 -0.6597
GBDT Models 10min 20min 30min 40min 50min 60min 70min 80min 100min 120min 150min 180min
Fl
ow
FIT101 -0.2229 -0.0245 0.4313 0.7742 0.9112 0.9413 0.9755 0.9741 · · · · · · · · · 0.9637
FIT201 -0.7116 0.3545 0.9584 0.9633 0.9504 0.9642 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 0.9421
FIT301 -0.9453 0.2496 0.8051 0.9734 0.9731 0.9751 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 0.9524
FIT401 -0.2124 0.3120 0.7015 0.8125 0.8342 0.8861 0.8453 0.7921 · · · · · · · · · 0.8025
Pr. DPIT301 -0.5508 0.8218 0.9387 0.9757 0.9818 0.9831 0.9912 0.9901 0.9875 0.9706 0.9496 0.9085
T.
Le
ve
l LIT101 -0.042 -0.1352 -0.153 0.3858 0.6459 0.7881 0.8536 0.8680 0.8961 0.9221 0.8721 0.9019
LIT301 -0.0419 -0.2151 -0.0185 0.3863 0.7059 0.8208 0.6486 0.7938 0.5498 0.7363 · · · 0.7291
LIT401 -1.1415 0.1121 0.7123 0.8377 0.8503 0.8575 0.7731 0.7907 0.8764 0.8743 0.8741 0.8444
Table 2: Median time (mins; lower is better) for active learn-
ing (AL) configurations to achieve an r2 score above 0.9
Flow Pressure Tank Level
AL Config. FI
T1
01
FI
T2
01
FI
T3
01
FI
T4
01
D
PI
T3
01
LI
T1
01
LI
T3
01
LI
T4
01
Linear (EBCM) 25 15 30 15 30 — — —
Linear (EMCM) 20 20 45 15 40 — — —
GBDT (EBCM) 10 10 25 10 30 35 30 45
GBDT (EMCM) 10 10 25 10 20 40 40 45
to attacks being found in all cases for the 10 bit flip restriction. With
active learning enabled, the difference is often significant (e.g. 0%
vs. 100% for FIT401, 10 bit flips). The results suggest that active
learning is key for finding the ‘critical bits’ in payloads, given its
ability to sample and query new data. Models that have only been
pre-trained just recognise trends observed in normal data, and do
not necessarily know which bits involved in the patterns are the
critical ones for enacting an attack.
Active learning is effective at identifying critical bits in
payloads, and can lead to significantly higher success rates
in attack discovery.
RQ3 (Comparisons). Our third RQ assesses how active fuzzing
performs against two baselines. First, for every sensor (as targeted
in RQ2), we randomly generate 1000 k-bit payload manipulations
(where k is 1–5 or 10) and assess for them the attack success rates (a
percentage, as calculated in RQ2). Second, we qualitatively compare
our attacks against the ones identified by the LSTM-based fuzzer for
SWaT [26] as well as an established benchmark of SWaT network
attacks [41] that was manually crafted by experts.
Results. The results of the random flipping baseline are given in
the final rows of Table 3. Clearly, this is not an effective strategy for
finding attacks based on packet manipulation, as no success rate
exceeds 0.5%. This is unsurprising due to the huge search space
involved. Note also that for the more challenging over/underflow
attacks, random bit flipping is unable to find any examples at all.
Regarding the LSTM-based fuzzer for SWaT [26], a side-by-side
comparison is difficult to make as it does not manipulate packets
but rather only issues high-level actuator commands (e.g.“OPEN
MV101”). Our approach is able to find attacks spanning the same
range of sensed properties, but does so by manipulating the bits of
packets directly (closer to the likely behaviour of a real attacker) and
without the same level of network control (other than true sensor
readings, which both approaches require). In this sense our attacks
are more elaborate than those of the LSTM fuzzer. Our approach is
also substantially faster: active fuzzing can train effective models in
50-85 minutes, whereas the underlying model used in [26] required
approximately two whole days.
Our coverage of the SWaT benchmark [41] is comparable to
that of [26], since both approaches find attacks spanning the same
sensed properties. However, all of the attacks in [41] and [26] are
implemented at Level 1 of the network. Active fuzzing instead
generates packet-manipulating attacks at Level 0, which has the
advantage of avoiding interactions with the PLC code, possibly
making manipulations harder to detect (e.g. bypassing command
validation checks). In this sense, the attacks that active fuzzing finds
complement and enrich the benchmark.
Active fuzzing finds attacks covering the same sensors as
comparable work, but with significantly less training time,
and by manipulating packets directly.
RQ4 (Attack Detection). Our final RQ considers whether our
learnt models can be used not only for attack discovery but also
attack prevention. In particular, we investigate their use in two
defence mechanisms: an anomaly detector and an early warning
system. We then assess how effective they are detecting attacks.
To perform anomaly detection, we continuously perform the fol-
lowing process: we read the current values of sensors, and then use
our learnt models to predict their values 5 seconds into the future
(30 seconds for tank levels). After 5 (or 30) seconds have passed, the
actual values va are compared with those that were predicted vp ,
and an anomaly is reported if |vp −va |/vm > 0.05 (or |vp −va | > 5
for tanks), wherevm is the largest possible observable value for the
sensor. To evaluate the effectiveness of this detection scheme, we
implement an experiment on actual historian data extracted from
SWaT [41]. For each sensor in turn, we randomly generate 1000
spoofed sensor values by randomly adding or subtracting values (in
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Table 3: Success rates (%s; higher is better) of different model configurations for finding packet manipulations (1-5 and 10 bit
flips) that successfully drive SWaT’s flow, pressure, and tank level readings to safety thresholds
Flow Pr. Level
Models (1 Bit Flip) FI
T1
01
FI
T2
01
FI
T3
01
FI
T4
01
D
PI
T3
01
LI
T1
01
LI
T3
01
LI
T4
01
Li
ne
ar
Pre-Train Only (40min) 0.5 4.4 1.3 1.8 0.9 0 0 0
Pre-Train Only (90min) 0.8 3.8 1.4 0.2 2.5 0 0 0
Active Learning (EBCM) 27 22.3 7.5 43.9 14.4 0 0 0
Active Learning (EMCM) 29.4 19.2 7.9 36.6 9.1 0 0 0
GB
D
T
Pre-Train Only (40min) 0 59.3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pre-Train Only (90min) 0 57.7 30.3 0 0 0 0 0
Active Learning (EBCM) 97.7 99.2 97.9 75.4 96.1 0 0 0
Active Learning (EMCM) 97.6 99.4 97.6 13.5 95.3 0 0 0
— Random (No Model) 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0
Flow Pr. Level
Models (2 Bit Flips) FI
T1
01
FI
T2
01
FI
T3
01
FI
T4
01
D
PI
T3
01
LI
T1
01
LI
T3
01
LI
T4
01
Li
ne
ar
Pre-Train Only (40min) 0.7 8 1.9 3.1 1.7 0.2 0 0
Pre-Train Only (90min) 2.7 9.4 4.1 0.6 6.6 0 0 0
Act. Learning (EBCM) 46.1 39.1 15.1 77.6 30.1 2 0 0
Act. Learning (EMCM) 47.4 31.8 16.5 72.4 17.9 0.6 0 0
GB
D
T
Pre-Train Only (40min) 0 98.7 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pre-Train Only (90min) 0.3 96 59 0 0 0 0 0
Act. Learning (EBCM) 100 99.9 100 100 99.9 76.4 0 0
Act. Learning (EMCM) 100 100 99.7 100 99.9 87.1 0 0
— Random (No Model) 0.3 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0
Flow Pr. Level
Models (3 Bit Flips) FI
T1
01
FI
T2
01
FI
T3
01
FI
T4
01
D
PI
T3
01
LI
T1
01
LI
T3
01
LI
T4
01
Li
ne
ar
Pre-Train Only (40min) 1.2 10.6 3.5 3.5 3 0 0 0
Pre-Train Only (90min) 4.2 12.5 5.5 0.5 8.2 0 0 0
Act. Learning (EBCM) 58.6 50.6 25.7 91.7 37.2 4.2 0.1 0.1
Act. Learning (EMCM) 60.4 45.1 21.4 88.7 24.2 2.7 0.3 0
GB
D
T
Pre-Train Only (40min) 0 100 0.1 0 0 0 0 0
Pre-Train Only (90min) 1.1 100 80.6 0 0 0 0 0
Act. Learning (EBCM) 100 100 100 100 100 97 8.1 23.7
Act. Learning (EMCM) 100 100 99.7 100 100 99.2 3.7 32.3
— Random (No Model) 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0 0 0
Flow Pr. Level
Models (4 Bit Flips) FI
T1
01
FI
T2
01
FI
T3
01
FI
T4
01
D
PI
T3
01
LI
T1
01
LI
T3
01
LI
T4
01
Li
ne
ar
Pre-Train Only (40min) 0.9 13.8 5.4 4.9 4.3 0 0 0
Pre-Train Only (90min) 6.4 15.1 7.5 0.9 12.1 0 0 0
Act. Learning (EBCM) 71.6 65 27.9 97.7 49.1 11.4 0.1 0.2
Act. Learning (EMCM) 75.1 26.8 31.1 95.7 29.2 5.4 0.3 0
GB
D
T
Pre-Train Only (40min) 0 100 0.7 0 0 0 0 0
Pre-Train Only (90min) 1.2 100 96.1 0 0 0 0 0
Act. Learning (EBCM) 100 100 100 100 100 100 20.4 55.7
Act. Learning (EMCM) 100 100 99.7 100 100 100 17.7 67.3
— Random (No Model) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0 0 0
Flow Pr. Level
Models (5 Bit Flips) FI
T1
01
FI
T2
01
FI
T3
01
FI
T4
01
D
PI
T3
01
LI
T1
01
LI
T3
01
LI
T4
01
Li
ne
ar
Pre-Train Only (40min) 1.7 19.3 6.2 5.7 4.3 0.4 0 0
Pre-Train Only (90min) 6.6 18.4 8.7 1.1 13.5 0.1 0 0
Act. Learning (EBCM) 78.3 71.6 35.4 99.5 56.6 16.3 0.5 0
Act. Learning (EMCM) 81.5 62.6 36 97.9 39.3 9.3 0.5 0
GB
D
T
Pre-Train Only (40min) 0 100 3.1 0 0 0 0 0
Pre-Train Only (90min) 3.1 100 99.8 0 0.1 0 0 0
Act. Learning (EBCM) 100 100 100 100 100 100 29.7 76
Act. Learning (EMCM) 100 100 99.7 100 100 100 34.9 82.2
— Random (No Model) 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0 0 0
Flow Pr. Level
Models (10 Bit Flips) FI
T1
01
FI
T2
01
FI
T3
01
FI
T4
01
D
PI
T3
01
LI
T1
01
LI
T3
01
LI
T4
01
Li
ne
ar
Pre-Train Only (40min) 4.7 34.9 9.6 12.5 10.7 0.8 0 0
Pre-Train Only (90min) 13 38.3 19.2 2.3 29.1 1 0 0
Act. Learning (EBCM) 96.4 91 61.8 100 81.5 35.7 6.1 2.1
Act. Learning (EMCM) 96.7 89.1 59.5 100 63 29.1 5.7 0
GB
D
T
Pre-Train Only (40min) 0 100 31.5 0 0 0 0 0
Pre-Train Only (90min) 12.1 100 99.8 0 2.3 0 0 0
Act. Learning (EBCM) 100 100 100 100 100 100 72.2 99.3
Act. Learning (EMCM) 100 100 99.7 100 100 100 77 99.7
— Random (No Model) 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.5 0 0 0
Table 4: Success rates (%s; higher is better) of different anom-
aly detector models at detecting injected sensor values
Flow Pr. Tank Level
Anomaly Detector FI
T1
01
FI
T2
01
FI
T3
01
FI
T4
01
D
PI
T3
01
LI
T1
01
LI
T3
01
LI
T4
01
Li
ne
ar
Pre-Train Only (40min) 82.3 100 100 41.3∗ 100 8.2∗ 38.5∗ 40.1∗
Pre-Train Only (90min) 100 100 100 62.9∗ 100 67.8∗ 39.3∗ 13.2∗
Act. Learning (EBCM) 100 100 100 71.1∗ 100 59.8∗ 51.2∗ 64.1∗
Act. Learning (EMCM) 100 100 100 71.4∗ 100 57.5∗ 44.7∗ 50.7∗
GB
D
T
Pre-Train Only (40min) 100 100 100 100 100 71.8∗ 74.6∗ 76∗
Pre-Train Only (90min) 100 100 100 100 100 95.3 92.3 74.1
Act. Learning (EBCM) 100 100 100 100 100 91.8 95.5 84.1
Act. Learning (EMCM) 100 100 100 100 100 92.5 95.8 83.4
the range 5-10 for LITs, or 0.05vm through to 0.1vm for the others)
to sensor readings at different points of the data. We then use our
learnt models to determine what would have been predicted from
the data 5 or 30 seconds earlier, comparing the actual and predicted
values as described. We record the success rates of our anomaly
detectors at detecting these spoofed sensor readings.
Our early warning system is set up in a similar way, continuously
predicting the future readings of sensors based on the current net-
work traffic. The key difference is that rather than comparing actual
values with previously predicted values, we instead issue warnings
at the time of prediction if the future value of a sensor is outside of
its well-defined normal operational range. To experimentally assess
this, we manually subject the SWaT testbed to the Level 1 attacks
identified in [26] (which itself covers more unsafe states that the
SWaT benchmark [41]), targeting each sensor in turn. When each
attack is underway, we use our learnt models to predict the future
sensor readings. If a warning is issued at some point before a sensor
is driven outside of its normal range, we record this as a success.
We repeat this ten times for each sensor.
Results. Table 4 contains the results of our anomaly detection
experiment. The columns indicate the sensors for which values in
the data were manipulated, whereas the rows indicate the model
and active learning variant used. The values are the success rates,
i.e. the percentage of spoofed sensor values that were detected as
anomalous. Asterisks (∗) indicate where false positive rates were
above 5%, meaning the anomaly detectors were not practically
useful. For the flow and pressure sensors, most variants of model
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Table 5: Success rates (%s;higher is better) of differentmodels
at warning before sensors exit their safe ranges
Tank Level
Early Warning System LIT101 LIT301 LIT401
Linear (all variants) — — —
GB
D
T
Pre-Train Only (40min) — — —
Pre-Train Only (90min) 100 100 100
Active Learning (EBCM) 100 100 100
Active Learning (EMCM) 100 100 100
and active learning were able to successfully detect anomalies, the
main exception being FIT401 for which the linear model performed
poorly. The tank level sensors were more challenging to perform
anomaly detection for, but the GBDT models have a clear edge
over the linear ones. Active learning made little difference across
the experiments, except to improve the accuracy of the original 40
minute pre-trained models.
Table 5 contains the results of our early warning detection ex-
periment. The columns indicate the sensed properties that were
targeted by attacks (e.g. drive LIT101 outside of its safe range),
whereas the rows indicate the model and active learning variant
used. The values are the success rates, i.e. the percentages of at-
tacks that were warned about before succeeding. Cells containing
dashes (—) indicate that more than 5% of the warnings were false
positive, and thus too unreliable. The first thing to note is that the
experiment only considered the tank level sensors: this is because
the flow and pressure sensors can be forced into unsafe states very
quickly, requiring more immediate measures than an early warning
system. The tanks however take time to fill up or empty, and thus
are a more meaningful target for this solution. Second, the model
has a clear impact: GBDT models with either active learning or at
least 90 minutes of pre-training are accurate enough to warn about
100% of the attacks, whereas the linear models are not expressive
enough and suffer from false positives. Again, active learning im-
proves the accuracy of 40 minute pre-trained models sufficiently,
but otherwise is not critical: its key role is not in prevention but in
discovering attacks, through its ability to identify the critical bits to
manipulate.
Our models can be repurposed as anomaly detectors or
early warning systems, but active learning is not as critical
here as in attack discovery.
4.3 Threats to Validity
While our work has been extensively evaluated on a real critical
infrastructure testbed, threats to the validity of our conclusions of
course remain. First, while SWaT is a fully operational water treat-
ment testbed, it is not as large as the plants it is based on, meaning
our results may not scale-up (this is difficult to assess, as access to
such plants is subject to strict confidentially). Second, it may not
generalise to CPSs in domains that have different operational char-
acteristics, motivating future work to properly assess this. Finally,
while our anomaly detector performed well, our sensor spoofing at-
tacks were generated randomly, and may not be representative of a
real attacker’s behaviour (note however that the early warning sys-
tem was assessed using previously documented attacks). Similarly,
our early warning detection systems performed well at detecting
known over/underflow attacks, but these attacks are of the kind
that active fuzzing itself can generate: how the models perform
against different kinds of attacks requires further investigation.
5 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we highlight a selection of the literature that is
related to the main themes of this paper: learning from traffic (in-
cluding active learning), defending CPSs, and testing/verifying CPSs.
Learning from Network Traffic. The application of machine
learning to network traffic is a vibrant area of research [68], but
models are typically constructed to perform classification tasks. To
highlight a few examples: Zhang et al. [84] combine supervised
and unsupervised ML to learn models that can classify zero-day
traffic; Nguyen and Armitage [67] learn from statistical features of
sub-flows to classify between regular consumer traffic and traffic
originating from online games; and Atkinson et al. [16] use a clas-
sifier to infer personal information by analysing encrypted traffic
patterns caused by mobile app usage. All these examples are in
contrast to active fuzzing, where regression models are learnt for
predicting how a set of network packets will cause a (true) sen-
sor reading of a CPS to change. We are not aware of other work
building regression models in a similar context.
Similar to active fuzzing, there are some works that apply active
learning, but again for the purpose of classification, rather than
regression. Morgan [65], for example, uses active learning to reduce
training time for streaming data classifiers, as do Zhao and Hoi [86]
but for malicious URL classifiers.
Defending CPSs. Several different research directions on detect-
ing and preventing CPS attacks have emerged in the last few years.
Popular approaches include anomaly detection, where data logs
(e.g. from historians) are analysed for suspicious events or pat-
terns [11, 15, 27, 45, 48, 52, 58, 61, 66, 69, 71]; digital fingerprinting,
where sensors are checked for spoofing by monitoring time and fre-
quency domain features from sensor and process noise [12, 13, 44,
56]; and invariant-based checks, where conditions over processes
and components are constantlymonitored [7, 8, 10, 18, 24, 25, 28, 39].
These techniques are meant to complement and go beyond the built-
in validation procedures installed in CPSs, which typically focus
on simpler and more localised properties of the system.
The strengths and weaknesses of different countermeasures has
been the focus of various studies. Urbina et al. [77] evaluated several
attack detection mechanisms in a comprehensive review, conclud-
ing that many of them are not limiting the impact of stealthy attacks
(i.e. from attackers who have knowledge about the system’s de-
fences), and suggest ways of mitigating this. Cárdenas et al. [19]
propose a general framework for assessing attack detection mecha-
nisms, but in contrast to the previous works, focus on the business
cases between different solutions. For example, they consider the
cost-benefit trade-offs and attack threats associated with different
methods, e.g. centralised vs. distributed.
As a testbed dedicated for cyber-security research, many differ-
ent countermeasures have been developed for SWaT itself. These
include anomaly detectors, typically trained on the publicly released
dataset [2, 41] using unsupervised learning techniques, e.g. [42, 52,
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58]. A supervised learning approach is pursued by [24, 25], who
inject faults into the PLC code of (a high-fidelity simulator) in order
to obtain abnormal data for training. Ahmed et al. [12, 13] imple-
mented fingerprinting systems based on sensor and process noise
for detecting spoofing. Adepu and Mathur [7, 8, 10] systematically
and manually derived physics-based invariants and other condi-
tions to be monitored during the operation of SWaT. Feng et al. [32]
also generate invariants, but use an approach based on learning
and data mining that can capture noise in sensor measurements
more easily than manual approaches.
Testing and Verifying CPSs. Several authors have sought to im-
prove the defences of CPSs by constructing or synthesising attacks
that demonstrate flaws to be fixed. Liu et al. [62] and Huang et
al. [50], for example, synthesise attacks for power grids that can
bypass bad measurement detection systems and other conventional
monitors. Dash et al. [30] target robotic vehicles, which are typically
protected using control-based monitors, and demonstrate three
types of stealthy attacks that evade detection. Uluagac et al. [76]
presented attacks on sensory channels (e.g. light, infrared, acoustic,
and seismic), and used them to inform the design of an intrusion
detection system for sensory channel threats. Active fuzzing shares
this goal of identifying attacks in order to improve CPS defences.
Fuzzing is a popular technique for automatically testing the de-
fences of systems, by providing them with invalid, unexpected,
or random input and monitoring how they respond. Our active
fuzzing approach does exactly this, guiding the construction of in-
put (network packets) using prediction models, and then observing
sensor readings to understand how the system responds. The clos-
est fuzzing work to ours is [26], which uses an LSTM-based model
to generate actuator configurations, but requires vast amounts of
data and system access to function effectively. Fuzzing has also
been applied for testing CPS models, e.g. CyFuzz [29] and Deep-
FuzzSL [72], which target models developed in Simulink. Outside
of the CPS domain, several fuzzing tools are available for software:
American fuzzy lop [83], for example, uses genetic algorithms to
increase the code coverage of tests; Cha et al. [22] use white-box
symbolic analysis on execution traces to maximise the number of
bugs they find; and grammar-based fuzzers (e.g. [40, 49]) use formal
grammars to generate complex structured input, such as HTML/-
JavaScript for testing web browsers. Fuzzing can also be applied
to network protocols in order to test their intrusion detection sys-
tems (e.g. [79]). Our work, in contrast, assumes that an attacker has
already compromised the network (as per Section 2).
There are techniques beyond fuzzing available for analysing CPS
models in Simulink. A number of authors have proposed automated
approaches for falsifying such models, i.e. for finding counterexam-
ples of formal properties. To achieve this, Yamagata et al. [14, 81]
use deep reinforcement learning, and Silvetti et al. [73] use active
learning. Chen et al. [23] also use active learning, but for mining
formal requirements from CPS models. Note that unlike these ap-
proaches, active fuzzing is applied directly at the network packet
level of a real and complex CPS, and therefore does not make any
of the abstractions that modelling languages necessitate.
A number of approaches exist that allow for CPSs to be formally
verified or analysed. These typically require a formal specifica-
tion or model, which, if available in the first place, may abstract
away important complexities of full-fledged CPS processes. Kang
et al. [55], for example, construct a discretised first-order model
of SWaT’s first three stages in Alloy, and analyse it with respect
to some safety properties. This work, however, uses high-level ab-
stractions of the physical process, only partially models the system,
and would not generalise to the packet-level analyses that active
fuzzing performs. Sugumar and Mathur [75] analyse CPSs using
timed automata models, simulating their behaviour under single-
stage single-point attacks. Castellanos et al. [20], McLaughlin et
al. [64], and Zhang et al. [85] perform formal analyses based on
models extracted from the PLC programs, whereas Etigowni et
al. [31] analyse information flow using symbolic execution. If a
CPS can be modelled as a hybrid system, then a number of formal
techniques may be applied, including model checking [34, 80], SMT
solving [36], reachability analysis [54], non-standard analysis [47],
process calculi [59], concolic testing [57], and theorem proving [70].
Defining a formal model that accurately characterises enough of the
CPS, however, is the hardest part, especially for techniques such as
active fuzzing that operate directly at the level of packet payloads.
6 CONCLUSION
We proposed active fuzzing, a black-box approach for automatically
building test suites of packet-level CPS network attacks, overcoming
the enormous search spaces and resource costs of such systems.
Our approach learnt regression models for predicting future sensor
values from the binary string payloads of network packets, and used
these models to identify payload manipulations that would achieve
specific attack goals (i.e. pushing true sensor values outside of their
safe operational ranges). Key to achieving this was our use of online
active learning, which reduced the amount of training data needed
by sampling examples that were estimated to maximally improve
the model. We adapted the EMCM [17] active learning framework
to CPSs, and proposed a new version of it that guided the process
by maximising behaviour change.
We presented algorithms for implementing active fuzzing, but
also demonstrated its efficacy by implementing it for the SWaT
testbed, a multi-stage water purification plant involving complex
physical and chemical processes. Our approach was able to achieve
comparable coverage to an established benchmark and LSTM-based
fuzzer, but with significantly less data, training time, and resource
usage. Furthermore, this coverage was achieved by more sophisti-
cated attacks than those of the LSTM-based fuzzer, which can only
generate high-level actuator commands and is unable to manipulate
packets directly. Finally, we showed that the models constructed in
active learning were not only useful for attack discovery, but also
for attack detection, by implementing them as anomaly detectors
and early warning systems for SWaT. We subjected the plant to
a series of random sensor-modification attacks as well as existing
actuator-manipulation attacks, finding that our most expressive
learnt models were effective at detecting them.
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